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Warrantless Administrative Searches Permissible
Under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of
1977: Marshall v. Stoudt's Ferry Preparation Co.
Stoudt's Ferry Preparation Company produces low-grade
fuel from a material that is extracted from sand and gravel
dredged from a riverbed. When a Labor Department safety in-
spector attempted to inspect the Stoudt's Ferry plant pursuant
to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977,1 he was de-
nied entry.2 Relying on the recent Supreme Court decision in
1. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-961 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). The Federal Mine Safety
and Health Act of 1977 will be referred to throughout this Comment as the
Mine Safety Act. Section 813(a) of the Act provides for inspections.
Authorized representatives of the Secretary [of Labor] or the Sec-
retary of Health, Education, and Welfare shall make frequent inspec-
tions and investigations in coal or other mines each year for the
purpose of (1) obtaining, utilizing, and disseminating information relat-
ing to health and safety conditions, the causes of accidents, and the
causes of diseases and physical impairments originating in such mines,
(2) gathering information with respect to mandatory health or safety
standards, (3) determining whether an imminent danger exists, and
(4) determining whether there is compliance with the mandatory
health or safety standards or with any citation, order, or decision is-
sued under this subchapter or other requirements of this chapter. In
carrying out the requirements of this subsection, no advance notice of
an inspection shall be provided to any person, except that in carrying
out the requirements of clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection, the Sec-
retary of Health, Education, and Welfare may give advance notice of in-
spections. In carrying out the requirements of clauses (3) and (4) of
this subsection, the Secretary [of Labor] shall make inspections of
each underground coal or other mine in its entirety at least four times
a year, and of each surface coal or other mine in its entirety at least
two times a year... For the purpose of making any inspection or in-
vestigation under this chapter, the Secretary [of Labor], or the Secre-
tary of Health, Education, and Welfare, .. . shall have a right of entry
to, upon, or through any coal or other mine.
30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (Supp. I 1978).
2. In denying entry to the inspector, Stoudt's Ferry initially claimed that
the plant did not come within the Mine Safety Act's definition of a mine. The
Third Circuit determined, however, that the Stoudt's Ferry operation was
within the scope of the Act. See Marshall v. Stoudt's Ferry Preparation Co., 602
F.2d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 665 (1980). Given the broad
coverage of the statute, this decision was undoubtedly correct. See 30 U.S.C.
§ 802(h) (Supp. 11 1978). Moreover, the legislative history of the Mine Safety
Act emphasizes that "what is considered to be a mine and to be regulated
under [the] Act [should] be given the broadest possibility [sic] interpreta-
tion," and that doubts are to "be resolved in favor of inclusion of a facility
within the coverage of the Act." S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, re-
printed in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3401, 3414.
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Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,3 which held that warrantless inspec-
tions under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
violated the fourth amendment,4 Stoudt's Ferry contended that
the warrantless search provision of the Mine Safety Act5 was
likewise unconstitutional. The district court disagreed and
granted the Secretary of Labor's request for a preliminary in-
junction to require Stoudt's Ferry to permit the inspection.6 On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed,
holding that "warrantless inspections and the procedure pro-
vided for enforcement in the Mine Safety Act meet the stan-
dards of reasonableness in [the] pervasively regulated
[mining] industry."7 Marshall v. Stoudt's Ferry Preparation
Co., 602 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 665
(1980).
The fourth amendment to the Constitution8 was enacted
"to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against ar-
bitrary invasions by governmental officials." 9 The first clause of
the amendment prohibits searches that are unreasonable, and
the second clause prescribes the form and content of warrants.
The relationship between these two clauses has been the sub-
ject of inconsistent interpretation by the Supreme Court.o Be-
3. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
4. Id. at 325. For a discussion of Barlow's, see notes 36-46 infra and ac-
companying text.
5. See 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (Supp. II 1978), quoted in note 1 supra.
6. See 602 F.2d at 591. At the urging of the company, however, the court
imposed a confidentiality requirement and granted a stay pending appeal. See
id.
The Mine Safety Act stipulates:
The Secretary may institute a civil action for relief, including a perma-
nent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or any other appropri-
ate order in the district court of the United States... whenever [an]
operator or his agent-
(C) refuses to admit [authorized] representatives to the coal or
other mine, [or]
(D) refuses to permit the inspection of the coal or other mine ....
30 U.S.C. § 818(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
7. 602 F.2d at 594.
8. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or afflmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
10. The Court has often shifted its emphasis from one clause to the other.
Compare Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948) ("law enforcement
agents must secure and use search warrants whenever reasonably practica-
ble") with United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) ("[t]he relevant
test is not whether it is [practicable] to procure a search warrant, but whether
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cause the prevailing interpretation emphasizes the
reasonableness clause," the current test of the constitutional-
ity of a warrantless search is "not whether it was reasonable to
procure a search warrant, but whether the search itself was
reasonable."12
For many years, the protections of the fourth amendment
were not thought to apply to administrative searches conducted
pursuant to a regulatory scheme.13 But in 1967, the Supreme
Court held in Camara v. Municipal Court14 that administra-
tive inspections of residential premises are subject to the
fourth amendment's warrant requirements. 5 In See v. City of
Seattle,'6 decided the same day as Camara, the Court ex-
tended the warrant requirement to administrative inspections
of commercial premises.' 7 Since those decisions, the issue has
the search was reasonable"). In the late 1960s, the Court appeared to shift its
emphasis back to the warrant clause. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
761-62 (1969). Since 1973, however, the Court has relied on reasonableness as
the "ultimate standard." Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973). See
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1978); United States v. Edwards,
415 U.S. 800, 807 (1974); Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.
CHi. L. REv. 47, 48-49 (1974).
11. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973).
12. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807 (1974) (citing Cooper v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967)).
13. It was widely believed that the fourth amendment applied only to crim-
inal investigations. See, e.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365-67 (1959);
Rothstein & Rothstein, Administrative Searches and Seizures: What Happened
to Camara and See?, 50 WAsH. L. REv. 341, 341-42 (1975).
14. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
15. In Camara, a municipal health inspector attempted to conduct a rou-
tine annual inspection for possible violations of the city's housing code. A
lessee refused to allow the inspector to search his apartment without a warrant
and was subsequently faced with criminal charges for refusal to permit a lawful
inspection. Id. at 525-27. The Court found:
Under the present system, when the inspector demands entry, the oc-
cupant has no way of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal
code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way of knowing
the lawful limits of the inspector's power to search, and no way of
knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper authori-
zation.... The practical effect of this system is to leave the occupant
subject to the discretion of the official in the field. This is precisely the
discretion to invade private property which we have consistently cir-
cumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the
need to search.
Id. at 532-33.
16. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
17. In See, the owner of a commercial warehouse refused to allow an in-
spector from the Seattle Fire Department to inspect his locked building with-
out a warrant and probable cause to believe that a violation of any city
ordinance actually existed. The inspection was part of a routine, periodic can-
vass conducted throughout the city to obtain compliance with the city's fire
code. The owner's refusal led to his arrest and prosecution. Id. at 541-42. The
Court applied the rule of Camara because it found that
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undergone much development, particularly with respect to stat-
utorily authorized warrantless inspections.18 Despite this de-
velopment, the Court has failed to articulate precise guidelines
to which individuals and businesses subject to administrative
inspections can conform.19 Nonetheless, two general precepts
are clear. First, the governing principle of Camara has not
been abandoned: "[E]xcept in certain carefully defined classes
of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is
'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search
warrant."20 Second, the standard of probable cause required
for the issuance of a warrant in an administrative search is less
stringent than its criminal counterpart.21 Administrative proba-
ble cause need not be based on specific knowledge of a viola-
tion in a particular place, but may be based merely on a
showing that "reasonable legislative or administrative stan-
dards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied with re-
spect to ... particular [premises]."22
[t~he businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitu-
tional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official en-
tries upon his private commercial property. The businessman, too, has
that right placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for vio-
lation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the inspector in
the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant.
Id. at 543. For a thorough discussion of the Camara and See cases, see
Edelman, Search Warrants and Sanitation Inspections-The New Look in En-
forcement, 23 Foori DRUG CosM. L.J. 52 (1968); LaFave, Administrative Searches
and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See Cases, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 1;
Note, The Fourth Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YALE L.J. 521 (1968);
3 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 209 (1967).
18. See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (OSHA); Yough-
iogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969); United States v. Business Builders,
Inc., 354 F. Supp. 141 (N.D. Okla. 1973) (Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act); United
States v. Del Campo Baking Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 1972) (Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
19. See Comment, When Are Administrative Inspections Warranted?, 50 U.
CoLO. L. REv. 231, 236-37 (1979).
20. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). The principle
applies equally to residential property, id. at 540, and to portions of commercial
premises not open to the public. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545
(1967).
21. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
22. Id. Under this less stringent standard, administrative probable cause
may be based on such factors as the passage of time, the nature of a building,
or the condition of an entire area. Id. It is also sufficient to show that a specific
business has been chosen for inspection "on the basis of a general administra-
tive plan for the enforcement of [an] Act derived from neutral sources such as,
for example, dispersion of employees in various types of industries across a
given area, and the desired frequency of searches in any of the lesser divisions
of the area." Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321 (1978). For a thought-
ful criticism of the use of a flexible probable cause standard, see LaFave, supra
note 17, at 11-20.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The uncertainty in this area of law centers around the ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement expressly or impliedly
sanctioned by the Camara-See Court and the application of
these exceptions in subsequent cases. The Camara-See Court
authorized warrantless searches in four situations: when the
inspection is prompt and is conducted in response to an emer-
gency situation;23 when there is consent to the inspection;24
when the inspection is conducted in an area open to the pub-
lic; 25 and when the inspection is conducted in connection with
a licensing program.2 6 The licensing exception has been the
catalyst for much of the subsequent litigation. In Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States,27 the Supreme Court inti-
mated that Congress could reasonably mandate warrantless in-
spections in an industry with a long history of close
government regulation. 28 Two years later, the Court articulated
23. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967).
24. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967). The exception is implicit
in the language that "administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions
of commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be com-
pelled through prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant
procedure." Id. (emphasis added). See United States v. Thriftimart, Inc., 429
F.2d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970); United States v. Ham-
mond Milling Co., 413 F.2d 608, 610-11 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1002
(1970). See also United States v. Litvin, 353 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (D.D.C. 1973);
Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 13, at 353-58.
25. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967). It should be noted that
where the public has as much access to the premises as the inspector, the in-
spection is not actually a search. See United States v. Various Gambling De-
vices, 478 F.2d 1194, 1200 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Golden, 413 F.2d 1010,
1011 (4th Cir. 1969); Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 13, at 366-70.
26. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967). The Court declined to
rule on inspections required prior to operating a licensed business or market-
ing a product that is part of a licensing program. "Any constitutional challenge
to such programs," the Court stated, "can only be resolved ... on a case-by-
case basis under the general Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness."
Id. By 1970, however, the Court had implicitly sanctioned a broader licensing
exception, see Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77
(1970), and has since done so explicitly. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972);
Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 13, at 358-66.
27. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
28. In Colonnade, the petitioner ran a catering establishment that was li-
censed to serve alcoholic beverages. Internal Revenue Service agents at-
tempted to inspect petitioner's locked storeroom for a possible violation of the
federal excise tax law, but were refused entry because they had no search war-
rant. The agents subsequently broke the lock on the storeroom, entered, and
seized a number of bottles of liquor that had allegedly been refilled in violation
of federal law. Id. at 72-73.
The Supreme Court noted that regulation of the liquor industry dated back
to seventeenth century England and was carried over to the American Colo-
nies. Under those early liquor laws, federal officers were given broad powers to
inspect the premises of distillers and importers without a warrant. Id. at 75.
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that notion in United States v. Biswell,29 plainly carving out an
exception to the warrant requirement in administrative inspec-
tions for industries that are '"pervasively regulated."30
In Biswell, the Court found the exception necessary for
several reasons. First, inspection was a crucial part of a regula-
tory scheme that furthered urgent federal interests.3 ' Second,
since effective enforcement could not be accomplished without
frequent and unannounced inspections, a warrant requirement
was at odds with Congress' purpose in regulating the specific
activity.3 2 Finally, inspections for compliance with the regula-
tory scheme '"pose[d] only limited threats to the [business-
man's] justifiable expectations of privacy," because an
individual who chooses to engage in a licensed and pervasively
regulated business does so with the knowledge that the regu-
lated aspects of the business will be subject to effective inspec-
tion.33 The Court thus found warrantless inspections to be
The Court recognized that, with respect to an industry with such a long history
of "close supervision and inspection,.. . Congress has broad authority to fash-
ion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures." Id. at 77. The
Court found, however, that the standard selected by Congress under the stat-
ute in question did not allow forcible entries without a warrant, and that the
seized evidence must therefore be suppressed. Id.
29. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
30. Id. at 316. In Biswell, a Federal Treasury agent searched respondent's
locked gun storeroom and seized unlicensed firearms found therein. The
search was made without a warrant as part of an inspection procedure author-
ized by the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1976). Respondent, a
pawnshop operator who had a federal license to deal in sporting weapons, al-
lowed the search on the basis of the statute's purported authority. See 406 U.S.
at 311-12. The Court held that where "regulatory inspections further urgent
federal interest [sic], and the possibilities of abuse and the threat to privacy
are not of impressive dimensions, the inspection may proceed without a war-
rant where specifically authorized by statute." Id. at 317.
31. 406 U.S. at 315-16. The Court stated that "close scrutiny of [firearms]
traffic is undeniably of central importance to federal efforts to prevent violent
crime and to assist the States in regulating the firearms traffic within their bor-
ders." Id. at 315. Similarly, the Court in Colonnade recognized that "[iun the
case of excisable or dutiable articles, the government has an interest in them
for the payment of the duties thereon, and until such duties are paid has a
right to keep them under observation, or to pursue and drag them from con-
cealment." 397 U.S. at 76 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624
(1886)).
32. See 406 U.S. at 316. The Court distinguished See v. City of Seattle, not-
ing that in See the conditions that constituted violations of the building code
were "relatively difficult to conceal or to correct in a short time," and that
therefore the delay in time required to obtain a warrant when entry was denied
would not threaten the effectiveness of the inspection system. Id. In Biswell,
however, the objects being searched for were easy to move or conceal in a short
period of time. The delay attendant to a search warrant requirement could re-
sult in removal or concealment of the illegal objects, thereby frustrating the
purpose of the regulatory scheme. Id.
33. Id. See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973).
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"reasonable official conduct under the Fourth Amendment."34
In subsequent cases many lower courts, hampered by un-
clear guidelines, expanded the Colonnade-Biswell exception in
ways that threatened to swallow up the rule of Camara and
See.35 But in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,36 the Supreme Court
ended expansion of the exception. In Barlow's, the Court held
that inspections under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA)37 without a warrant or its equivalent violate the fourth
amendment.38 The Court first reiterated the governing princi-
ple of Camara and See, that "warrantless searches are gener-
ally unreasonable." 39 Next, it analyzed the recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement. The Court narrowly
34. 406 U.S. at 316.
35. Apparently, lower courts initially ignored the Supreme Court's man-
date in Camara and See that a warrant was required for all but a few excep-
tional, carefully defined situations. The consent exception to the warrant
requirement, with a standard considerably more lax than that of the criminal
law, was often used by lower courts to find that an individual had waived his
fourth amendment rights. See United States v. Thriftimart, Inc., 429 F.2d 1006,
1010 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970) (casual consent to Food and
Drug Administration inspectors' request for permission to inspect held valid as
knowing and voluntary even though inspectors did not warn defendant ware-
house managers of their right to insist on a warrant); United States v. Ham-
mond Milling Co., 413 F.2d 608, 610-11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1002
(1969) (consent to a routine Food and Drug Administration inspection held
valid where the company vice-president did not refuse inspection, even though
he did not expressly consent to it); United States v. Litvin, 353 F. Supp. 1333,
1338 (D.D.C. 1973) (warrantless search of warehouse pursuant to the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act held valid due to voluntary consent of the warehouse-
man where the evidence showed there was no official intimidation and that in-
spectors regularly conducted monthly inspections of the premises); Rothstein &
Rothstein, supra note 13, at 353-58.
The licensing exception to the warrant requirement was similarly ex-
panded until it appeared that the exception would become the rule. See United
States ex rel. Terracino v. Montanye, 493 F.2d 682, 684-85 (2d Cir. 1974) (war-
rantless search and seizure of pharmacist's records pursuant to a state law lim-
iting search to particular items subject to heavy regulation held constitutional,
because "the warrant, which would be issued for the asking, would simply
track the statute and would give the person who was the object of the search
nothing more than he already had"); Brennan v. Buckeye Indus., Inc., 374 F.
Supp. 1350, 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1974) (licensing exception expanded to include in-
spections pursuant to OSHA); Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F.
Supp. 45, 51-52 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (licensing exception applied to a pervasively
regulated but unlicensed industry); Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 13, at
358-66.
36. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
38. 436 U.S. at 325. It has been suggested that the existing OSHA provision
for warrantless searches could be functionally equivalent to a warrant. See
Comment, supra note 19, at 240-41. The Barlow's Court mentioned but did not
rule on the issue. See 436 U.S. at 325 n.23.
39. 436 U.S. at 312. The Court later noted that this is a "constitutional re-
quirement." Id. at 324.
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construed the Colonnade-Biswell exception 4O and concluded
that it could not be applied to OSHA.4' The Court rejected the
argument that effective enforcement of OSHA would be im-
paired by a warrant requirement, reasoning that the advan-
tages of surprise could be preserved even if warrants were
required,42 and that the burdens of obtaining a warrant would
not be so great as to lessen the effectiveness of OSHA inspec-
tions. 43
The Barlow's Court rejected the appellant's argument that
requiring a warrant for OSHA inspections would, as a practical
matter, invalidate the warrantless search provisions of other
regulatory statutes.4 The Court explicitly limited its holding to
"the facts and law concerned with OSHA" and left the issue of
the constitutionality of other administrative inspection
schemes to resolution on a case-by-case basis. 4 5 In future
cases, "[t]he reasonableness of a warrantless search [will] de-
40. Id. at 313 ('The clear import of our cases is that the closely regulated
industry of the type involved in Colonnade and Biswell is the exception.").
41. Id. at 313-14. The Court rejected the argument that businesses subject
to OSHA are pervasively regulated. "[Nothing] but the most fictional sense of
voluntary consent to later searches [can] be found in the single fact that one
conducts a business affecting interstate commerce ... ." Id. at 314.
42. Id. at 316-20. The Court first asserted that most businessmen would
consent to inspection without warrant. The Court noted, however, that Bar-
low's might have an impact on whether owners choose to resist such searches.
Next, the Court reasoned that although there were indications that surprise
searches were contemplated, there was also a regulation providing that upon
refusal to allow an inspector a right of entry, the inspector must report the rea-
sons for the refusal to his superior, who must take appropriate action, "includ-
ing compulsory process, if necessary." Id. at 317 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4
(1977) (current version at 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4(a) (1979))). There was no showing
that the Act was any less effective as a result of the time lapse that ensued
when a businessman refused the initial requested entry and the inspector had
to obtain the necessary process. See 436 U.S. at 317-19. Finally, the Court of-
fered an alternative suggestion: if refused initial entry, the inspector could ob-
tain an ex parte warrant and reappear at some later date without further notice
to the establishment being inspected. Id. at 319-20.
43. 436 U.S. at 320-21. The Court noted that the probable cause required to
obtain a warrant is not measured by the strict standard of criminal law.
Rather, the standard is that delineated in Camara, requiring only that "reason-
able legislative or administrative standards for conducting an... inspection
are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment]." Id. at 320 (quoting
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967)). In the context of OSHA
inspections, this administrative probable cause standard would be satisfied by
a showing that a specific business has been chosen for inspection "on the basis
of a general administrative plan for the enforcement of [OSHA] derived from
neutral sources." 436 U.S. at 321. The Court expressed doubt "that the con-
sumption of enforcement energies in the obtaining of such warrants [would]
exceed manageable proportions." Id.
44. 436 U.S. at 321.
45. Id. at 321-22.
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pend upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy guaran-
tees of each statute."4
Stoudt's Ferry is the first appellate court decision to con-
sider, in light of the Barlow's decision, the constitutionality of
the Mine Safety Act's warrantless search provision.47 In
Stoudt's Ferry, the Third Circuit found that there were suffi-
cient differences between the Mine Safety Act and OSHA to
support the constitutionality of warrantless searches under the
Mine Safety Act.48 The court first drew distinctions between
the statutes by focusing on the types of businesses affected.
while OSHA applies to a wide range of enterprises affecting in-
terstate commerce, 49 the Mine Safety Act covers only a single,
pervasively regulated industry that has long been characterized
as very dangerous. 5 0 Further distinctions were made with re-
spect to the scope of inspection authorized by each statute:
while OSHA authorizes entry for inspection into any area
where work is being performed,5 ' the Mine Safety Act limits
the purposes for which inspectors may enter,5 2 limits searches
for which no advance notice can be given,53 and provides an op-
portunity for immediate judicial review.54 The court thus found
46. Id. at 321.
47. Essentially the same issue was considered in 1973 under the predeces-
sor of the Mine Safety Act, the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742. The constitutionality of the 1969 Act, which
contained a warrantless search provision virtually identical to that in the Mine
Safety Act, was upheld in Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F.
Supp. 45, 51-52 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
48. 602 F.2d at 594. The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have agreed. See
Marshall v. Sink, 614 F.2d 37, 39 (4th Cir. 1980); Marshall v. Texolne Co., 612
F.2d 935, 938 (5th Cir. 1980); Marshall v. Nolichuckey Sand Co., 606 F.2d 693, 696-
97 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3675 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1980).
49. See 602 F.2d at 593.
50. Id. at 593-94.
51. In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary,
upon presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or
agent in charge, is authorized-
(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory,
plant, establishment, construction site, or other area, workplace or en-
vironment where work is performed by an employee of an employer;
and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at
other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reason-
able manner, any such place of employment and all pertinent condi-
tions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and
materials therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner,
operator, agent or employee.
29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976).
52. 602 F.2d at 594. See note 1 supra.
53. 602 F.2d at 594.
54. Id. Under the Mine Safety Act, the Secretary of Labor may seek judi-
cial relief in district court if an inspector is denied entry. See 30 U.S.C. § 818(a)
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that the inspection provision of the Mine Safety Act was more
narrowly drawn than that of OSHA, and that there was "conse-
quently less likelihood of the abuses of 'unbridled discretion of
executive and administrative officers' which Barlow's found ob-
jectionable."55 Finally, although the Barlow's Court found that
surprise inspections were not essential to the effective enforce-
ment of OSHA,56 the Stoudt's Ferry court was "not prepared to
say that the legislative judgment as to their necessity in the
context of mine safety [was] misplaced." 57 These distinctions
persuaded the court that the Mine Safety Act's enforcement
scheme justified warrantless inspections and that the Act's re-
strictions on search discretion satisfied Barlow's reasonable-
ness standard.
The court's reasoning in Stoudt's Ferry is vague and mis-
leading. The court paid too little attention to fourth amend-
ment rationale and relied too heavily on mechanically drawn
distinctions from Barlow's. It reached the correct result in
finding the statute "reasonable," 8 but a close examination of
the court's rationale indicates that some of the distinctions
stressed do not, in fact, support the decision.
The Third Circuit panel made invalid distinctions concern-
ing the privacy guarantees of the Mine Safety Act, guarantees
like those relied on by the Barlow's Court in determining the
reasonableness of a warrantless search.59 These distinctions
formed the basis for the court's statement that there is less
likelihood that the "abuses of 'unbridled discretion'"60 found
objectionable in Barlow's will occur under the more narrowly
drawn Mine Safety Act provision. A careful analysis of these
differences, however, indicates that they are merely facial dis-
tinctions that fail to justify a different legal result.
The court first distinguished the Mine Safety Act from
(Supp. II 1978); note 6 supra. Note, however, that although OSHA does not pro-
vide for judicial review in the body of the statute, regulations promulgated pur-
suant to it do permit such relief. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1979).
55. 602 F.2d at 594 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323
(1978)).
56. See 436 U.S. at 316; note 42 supra and accompanying text.
57. 602 F.2d at 594.
58. The court interpreted the Barlow's test as follows: "[O]nly if [a stat-
ute] comes within a carefully defined exception may [it] validly authorize a
search without a warrant .... Otherwise, the reasonableness of a warrantless
administrative search will depend upon the specific enforcement needs and pri-
vacy guarantees of the particular statute under review." Id. at 593.
59. See 436 U.S. at 321.
60. 602 F.2d at 594 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323
(1978)).
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OSHA by noting that the Mine Safety Act's inspection provi-
sion "places limitations upon the purposes for which searches
may be made." 61 On a superficial level, the distinction seems
valid. OSHA inspectors are authorized to enter and inspect
"[iln order to carry out the purposes of [the Act],"62 and the
list of statutory purposes is quite extensive.63 In contrast, the
Mine Safety Act permits inspections for only four specific pur-
poses: to gather or disseminate information relating to health
and safety conditions; to gather information about mandatory
health and safety standards; to determine whether imminent
danger exists; and to determine whether there is compliance
with the mandatory standards of the Act.64 Although the Mine
Safety Act allows searches only for these four purposes, these
purposes are, in the aggregate, broad enough to encompass any
search that would carry out the purposes of OSHA.65 The Mine
Safety Act is thus no more narrow than OSHA in terms of the
purposes for which inspections may be conducted.
The second distinction made by the Stoudt's Ferry court
was that the Mine Safety Act limits those searches for which
no advance notice may be given, while OSHA does not.66 The
court, however, misconstrued the inspection provision of the
Mine Safety Act. The statute mandates that no advance notice
be given when an inspection is conducted either to determine
whether imminent danger exists or to determine whether there
is compliance with the statute.67 When an inspection is con-
ducted to gather or disseminate information, the statute pro-
61. 602 F.2d at 594.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976).
63. Id. § 651. The enumerated purposes and policies of OSHA include: en-
couraging the reduction of safety hazards, id. § 651(b) (1); "authorizing the Sec-
retary of Labor to set ... safety and health standards," id. § 651(b) (3);
"providing for research in the field of occupational safety and health," id.
§ 651(b) (5); "exploring ways to discover latent diseases," id. § 651(b) (6); pro-
viding medical criteria to ensure the good health of employees, id. § 651(b) (7);
"providing an effective enforcement program," id. § 651(b) (10); "providing for
appropriate reporting procedures," id. § 651(b) (12); and "encouraging joint la-
bor-management efforts to reduce injuries and disease arising out of employ-
ment," id. § 651(b) (13).
64. 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (Supp. II 1978), quoted in note 1 supra.
65. For example, one purpose of the Mine Safety Act, "obtaining, utilizing,
and disseminating information relating to health and safety conditions, the
causes of accidents, and the causes of diseases and physical impairments
originating in such mines," could conceivably encompass a number of OSHA's
purposes. Compare 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (Supp. II 1978) (emphasis added) with
29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(1), (4), (5), (6), (7), (13) (1976).
66. 602 F.2d at 594.
67. 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (Supp. II 1978).
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vides that the Secretary "may give advance notice."68 The
statute thus does not restrict the types of searches for which no
advance notice is required, but merely emphasizes the situa-
tions in which advance notice is proscribed, and sets out the
situations in which the inspector is authorized to give advance
notice if he so desires. Similarly, OSHA prohibits advance no-
tice of any inspection unless authorization is obtained from the
Secretary.69 Because there is no significant distinction be-
tween the advance notice provisions of the two statutes, the
court's reliance on this distinction was misplaced.
The third distinction made in Stoudt's Ferry was that the
search provision of the Mine Safety Act is "more narrowly
drawn" than OSHA's inspection provision.70 Presumably the
court was referring to the scope of search authorized by the
statutes. Again, this distinction does not withstand close exam-
ination. OSHA's search provision specifically creates a broad
right of entry into virtually any employee work area to inspect
almost anything found there.7 1 The Mine Safety Act, however,
is equally broad; the regulation of health and safety standards
in the mining industry necessitates access to the entire active
work area of the mine.72 The court's emphasis on this distinc-
tion is therefore misleading; the scope of search authorized
under either statute is quite broad.
The fourth distinction made by the court was that the pro-
vision in the Mine Safety Act for immediate judicial review
when entry is refused affords greater protection to the busi-
nessman's privacy expectations than does OSHA.73 Although
the court found this distinction "significant," 74 examination of
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 666(f) (1976). Both statutes prohibit advance notice without
authorization. The Mine Safety Act, however, appears to be more narrow than
OSHA because in the Mine Safety Act there are two specific situations in
which advance notice can never be authorized. See 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (Supp. H
1978). Under OSHA, advance notice can be authorized in any circumstances
deemed appropriate. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.6(a) (1979). For all practical pur-
poses, however, this difference is negligible.
70. 602 F.2d at 594.
71. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
72. See Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 51 (S.D.
Ohio 1973) (to enforce the Act's regulations, the scope of inspection must be
"coterminous with the operation of the mine"). But cf. United States v. Consol-
idation Coal Co., 560 F.2d 214, 217 (6th Cir. 1977) (warrant required to inspect
"offices on the mining property" or like areas where the mine operator expects
privacy), vacated and remanded, 436 U.S. 942, judgment reinstated, 579 F.2d
1011 (6th Cir. 1978).
73. 602 F.2d at 594 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 818).
74. 602 F.2d at 594.
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the two statutes reveals that their review provisions are practi-
cally indistinguishable. OSHA regulations state that when an
inspector is refused entry, he must report the reason for the re-
fusal to his superiors, who must "promptly take appropriate ac-
tion, including compulsory process, if necessary."75 If the
businessman continues to refuse entry, OSHA administrators
must resort to judicial process to gain entry. Both statutes thus
require the intervention of a judicial officer when an inspector
cannot gain entry to inspect. However, the protection this re-
quirement affords the privacy expectations of the businessman
is negligible. Because the Mine Safety Act's inspection provi-
sion was constitutionally upheld,76 the mine owner's only meri-
torious claim in an injunction proceeding under the Act would
be that the attempted inspection is outside the scope of the
statute.7 7 Such an attack is likely to prevail only if the opera-
tion being inspected does not fall within the Act's definition of
a mine 78 or if blatant harassment is involved.79 The same con-
sequences inhere in any compulsory action taken under OSHA.
Therefore, the court's distinction is misleading. The two stat-
utes provide essentially identical relief when an inspector is re-
fused entry to work premises; however, such relief provides
only minimal protection of privacy expectations.
75. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4(a) (1979). "Compulsory process" is defined as "the
institution of any appropriate action, including ex parte application for an in-
spection warrant or its equivalent." Id. § 1903.4(d).
76. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
77. The Stoudt's Ferry court assumes that the employer would be able to
claim more, stating that in the injunction proceeding "[a]ny unusual privacy
expectations may be fully explored ... and a reasonable accommodation may
be achieved." 602 F.2d at 594. But since three circuit courts have now upheld
the inspection provision of the Mine Safety Act, see note 48 supra and accom-
panying text, a mine owner probably could not successfully argue that warrant-
less searches under the Act are unconstitutional.
78. Given the Act's expansive definition of a mine, see note 2 supra, the
attack would likely fail.
79. This second avenue of attack would probably be a claim of denial of
equal protection because of harassment or selective enforcement. However,
"the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a fed-
eral constitutional violation." Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). To estab-
lish a violation of equal protection because of selective enforcement or
selective prosecution, the mine owner bears the burden of establishing
(1) that, while others similarly situated have not generally been pro-
ceeded against because of conduct of the type forming the basis of the
charge against him, he has been singled out for prosecution, and (2)
that the government's discriminatory selection of him for prosecution
has been invidious or in bad faith, i.e., based upon such impermissible
considerations as race, religion, or the desire to prevent his exercise of
constitutional rights.
United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974). See also United
States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 1978).
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It is apparent that these four distinctions do not adequately
support the court's decision. Nonetheless, the four remaining
distinctions drawn by the court, relating to the nature of the in-
dustry and the importance of warrantless searches to enforce-
ment of the regulatory scheme of the Act, provide a firm basis
for the decision. Unfortunately, the court's vague analysis not
only obscures the significance of these distinctions, but also
fails to explain how they relate to the Colonnade-Biswell ex-
ception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement.80
First, the court alluded several times81 to the fact that al-
though the Mine Safety Act applies only to a single industry,8 2
OSHA applies to every business and industry that affects inter-
state commerce.83 It is likely that this overwhelming coverage
was a major factor in the Supreme Court's refusal to validate
warrantless inspections in Barlow's. OSHA applies to more
than six million businesses and industries. 84 "Approval of war-
rantless inspections in such an 'across the board' manner
would have eviscerated [the rule established in Camara and
See, and] would have turned the exception into the rule."85
Thus, the Mine Safety Act is more constrained than OSHA sim-
ply because it applies to just one industry.
Second, the Third Circuit noted that the Mine Safety Act
regulates an industry that has a "history of [pervasive] govern-
mental regulation."86 This distinction is well supported by both
the legislative history of the Mine Safety Act87 and case law.8 8
Federal regulation of the mining industry can be traced back to
1910,89 and state regulation began even earlier.90 In contrast,
80. See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
81. See 602 F.2d at 593-94.
82. See Marshall v. Nolichuckey Sand Co., 606 F.2d 693, 696 (6th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3675 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1980).
83. OSHA was promulgated as an "exercise of [Congress'] powers to regu-
late commerce among the several States and with foreign nations." 29 U.S.C.
§ 651(b) (1976).
84. Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437, 440 (D. Idaho 1977).
85. Marshall v. Nolichuckey Sand Co., 606 F.2d 693, 696 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3675 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1980). The Camara-See rule is discussed
at text accompanying note 20 supra.
86. 602 F.2d at 593.
87. See S. REP. No. 181, supra note 2, at 1-5, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3401-05.
88. See Marshall v. Nolichuckey Sand Co., 606 F.2d 693, 695 (6th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3675 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1980); Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal
Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 47 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
89. See S. REP. No. 181, supra note 2, at 1-2, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3401-02.
90. See Brief for the Appellee at 25, Marshall v. Stoudt's Ferry Preparation
Co., 602 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing 3 RocKy MOUNTAn MmERAL LAw FouN-
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OSHA applies to every industry involved in interstate com-
merce; it can hardly be claimed that all such industries are per-
vasively regulated. The Mine Safety Act is thus distinguishable
from OSHA in that it applies to a pervasively regulated indus-
try.91
Third, the court found that the Mine Safety Act "is aimed
at an industry with an acknowledged history of serious acci-
dents. 92 This finding is documented in both the legislative his-
tory of the Act93 and case law.94 The extremely hazardous
nature of mining has led to the enactment of increasingly com-
prehensive and punitive laws designed to reduce the dangers
present in the occupation.95 No similar claim can be made
about the majority of industries regulated under OSHA.
Clearly, not every industry affecting interstate commerce is ex-
tremely dangerous.
Finally, the count addressed the need for surprise inspec-
tions under the Mine Safety Act. In Barlow's, the Court re-
jected the claim that a warrant requirement would impair
effective enforcement of OSHA.96 The Stoudt's Ferry court
noted the Barlow's rejection but was reluctant to make a simi-
lar judgment with respect to mine safety inspections. 97 The
legislative history of the Mine Safety Act, unlike that of OSHA,
DATION, AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 19.11 (1976)), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 665
(1980).
91. Prior to 1977, the mining industry was regulated under two separate
statutes: the Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act (the Metal Act),
Pub. L No. 89-577, 80 Stat. 772 (1966) (repealed 1977), and the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (the Coal Act), Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat.
742 (current version at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-961 (1976 & Supp. II 1978)). The Metal
Act was far less comprehensive than the Coal Act in the scope of its regulation.
See S. REP. No. 181, supra note 2, at 5, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 3405. The entire mining industry is now regulated under the Mine
Safety Act. Biswell demonstrates that a regulatory scheme that has been in ef-
fect a relatively short time will still fall under the Colonnade-Biswell exception
if it is currently pervasive in the scope of its regulation. See United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1972) (Gun Control Act in effect only since 1968).
92. 602 F.2d at 594.
93. See S. REP. No. 181, supra note 2, at 1-4, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3401-04. At the time of the Senate Report, statistics
showed that "every working day of the year, at least one miner is killed and
sixty-six miners suffer disabling injuries in our nation's mines." Id. at 4, re-
printed in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3404.
94. See Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 52 r7
(S.D. Ohio 1973) (mining industry characterized as "nearly inherently danger-
ous").
95. See S. REP. No. 181, supra note 2, at 1-4, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3401-04.
96. 436 U.S. at 316. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
97. 602 F.2d at 594.
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specifically emphasized the need for unannounced inspec-
tions.98 Congress was concerned with "the notorious eLse with
which many safety or health hazards [could] be concealed if
advance warning of inspection [was] obtained."99 Because
such hazards can be temporarily remedied, a warrant require-
ment could impair effective enforcement of the Mine Safety
Act. A mine owner could refuse an inspector entry until a war-
rant was obtained in order to take cosmetic safety steps before
the inspector's return. 0 0 Although the Barlow's Court found
that such delays had not impaired the effectiveness of OSHA
inspections, there is a strong possibility that such delays could
frustrate inspection under the Mine Safety Act and that "a war-
rant requirement would seriously undercut [the] Act's objec-
tives."' 0 ' Thus, there is a more urgent need for surprise
inspections to effectuate the purpose of the regulatory scheme
under the Mine Safety Act than under OSHA.102
98. See S. REP. No. 181, supra note 2, at 27, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 3427. Unannounced inspection was also mandated by the
predecessor of the Mine Safety Act, the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969, Pub. L No. 91-173, § 103(a), 83 Stat. 749.
99. S. REP. No. 181, supra note 2, at 27, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 3427.
100. Of course, an inspector could eliminate this problem by obtaining a
warrant prior to every search he makes. The Supreme Court indicated, how-
ever, that it does not intend such a procedure to be followed; rather, it wants an
inspector to obtain a warrant only after entry has been refused. See Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539-40 (1967). See also Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,
436 U.S. 307, 319-20 (1978) (Court suggests using ex parte warrant procedures
only after entry has been refused).
101. S. REP. No. 181, supra note 2, at 27, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 3427.
102. Similar concerns were urged in Barlow's with respect to OSHA, but
were rejected by the Supreme Court. See 436 U.S. at 316-20; note 42 supra and
accompanying text. Several factors, however, make the argument a stronger
one in the context of the Mine Safety Act. First, the risk that was thought to
follow in Barlow's was that the time delay would allow for the correction of vio-
lations. See 436 U.S. at 316. Under the Mine Safety Act, however, the risk is
that hazardous conditions would be temporarily disguised, thus avoiding not
only detection but also correction. Since correction of safety violations is the
goal of the statute, the delay attendant to a search warrant requirement could
frustrate the purpose of the Mine Safety Act.
Second, the nature and history of the mining industry militate in favor of
surprise inspections. Unlike all businesses regulated by OSHA, the mining in-
dustry has long been pervasively regulated and is highly dangerous. See notes
86-95 supra and accompanying text. Regulatory efforts prior to 1977, although
intensive, failed to prevent the numerous tragic deaths and injuries that oc-
curred in the mining industry. See S. REP. No. 181, supra note 2, at 4, reprinted
in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 3404. The need for more comprehen-
sive and punitive legislation to combat the situation was a major factor motivat-
ing Congress to require that no advance notice of inspection be given. Id. at 27,
reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3427.
Third, while the legislative history of the Mine Safety Act contains a clear
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Although the Stoudt's Ferry court did not explain how the
decision affects the Colonnade-Biswell exception, 0 3 it is clear
that the court has, in effect, broadened that exception. Both
Colonnade and Biswell dealt with inspection schemes that
were "carefully limited in time, place, and scope." 0 4 By con-
trast, the inspection provision of the Mine Safety Act is quite
broad; 05 it is not limited in time or scope 0 6 and is only slightly
limited in place. 0 7 The court therefore seems to have relaxed
the requirement that the search be narrowly circumscribed.
Although the court's decision to uphold the statute re-
quired it to broaden one aspect of the Colonnade-Biswell ex-
ception, its decision is justifiable because the overriding
congressional mandate for unannounced inspections, see id., OSHA contains
only vague indications that surprise searches were contemplated. See Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 317 (1978); 29 U.S.C. § 666(f) (1976); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1903.6 (1979). Moreover, because Congress twice considered the need for
unannounced inspections of mines, see note 98 supra and accompanying text,
Congress' mandate for such inspections is entitled to much greater deference
than are the implicit statutory and administrative references contained in
OSHA.
Finally, the Court indicated in Biswell that when a warrant requirement
would frustrate regulatory inspection of a pervasively regulated industry be-
cause the objects of inspection could be easily concealed or moved, warrantless
inspections should be considered reasonable conduct under the fourth amend-
ment. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
103. For a discussion of the exception, see notes 27-34 supra and accompa-
nying text.
104. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972). In Colonnade, inspec-
tion was governed by the Excise Tax Technical Changes Act of 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-859, § 5146(b), 72 Stat. 1348 (codified at LR.C. § 5146(b)), which reads in rele-
vant part:
The Secretary or his delegate may enter during business hours the
premises (including places of storage) of any dealer for the purpose of
inspecting or examining any records or other documents required to be
kept by such dealer under this chapter or regulations issued pursuant
thereto and any distilled spirits, wines, or beer kept or stored by such
dealer on such premises.
The provision is limited in time and scope. Further, its particularity in describ-
ing the objects of inspection serves to limit the places open to search.
In Biswell, the applicable statutory provision is similarly constrainech
The Secretary may enter during business hours the premises (includ-
ing places of storage) of any firearms or ammunition importer, manu-
facturer, dealer, or collector for the purpose of inspecting or examining
(1) any records or documents required to be kept by such importer,
manufacturer, dealer, or collector under the provisions of this chapter
or regulations issued under this chapter, and (2) any firearms or am-
munition kept or stored by such importer, manufacturer, dealer, or col-
lector at such premises.
Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 923(g), 82 Stat. 1223 (current ver-
sion at 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1976)).
105. See notes 61-72 supra and accompanying text.
106. See note 1 supra.
107. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
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requirements of the exception were satisfied. The mining in-
dustry is pervasively regulated. The hazardous nature of the
industry, evidenced by the high injury and death rate,10 8 dem-
onstrates that regulatory inspections are necessary in order to
further an urgent federal interest in mine safety. The ease with
which hazards can be disguised demonstrates that warrantless
inspections are necessary to ensure compliance with the Act.
Because the mining industry is so thoroughly regulated, the
mandated inspections "pose only limited threats to the [busi-
nessman's] justifiable expectations of privacy."10 9 Moreover,
the Act regulates only one industry; there is little danger that
expansion of the exception will destroy the fundamental princi-
ples of Camara and See.
In upholding the statute, the court, in effect, held that it is
always reasonable to search in the mining industry."O This
holding could have broad significance in the developing law of
administrative searches. It demonstrates that Congress may
confer on administrative officers a virtually boundless right to
search in industries that are pervasively regulated and acutely
dangerous. Moreover, it indicates that, despite judicial refer-
ences to the contrary, the current application of the Colonnade-
Biswell exception to the fourth amendment's warrant require-
ment is triggered not by limitations on the statutorily author-
ized right to search, but by the history, nature, and size of a
particular industry.
108. See notes 92-95 supra and accompanying text.
109. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972). See text accompany-
ing note 33 supra.
110. See Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 51-52
(S.D. Ohio 1973). In Youghiogheny, the district court stated that "Congress
has, in effect, pursuant to its police powers, substituted a legislative pronounce-
ment for case by case judicial determinations." Id. at 51.
It has, through [enactment of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969], essentially determined that probable cause or exigent cir-
cumstances exist in the coal industry so as to make warrantless
searching of its mines reasonable. Congress has further determined
that the conditions that prevail in many mines endanger or potentially
endanger the health and safety of the miners who work in this indus-
try. While neither Congress nor public opinion are free to suspend
constitutional protections by either statutory enactment or popular ref-
erendums,... Congress may, through the valid exercise of its Com-
merce Clause powers, attempt to delineate and define the limits of
these protections. In the Fourth Amendment area, where the essence
of the right hinges on a concept of reasonableness, the Congressional
definition is entitled to great weight.
Id. at 51-52 (citations omitted).
